Consultancy Services : Building a Cash Plus Response in Lebanon At Norwegian Refugee Council

Building a Cash Plus Response in Lebanon

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OVERVIEW

In its 10th year, the war in Syria endures and those that fled to Lebanon as refugees continue to be in a holding pattern, existing on the margins of society with limited access to the right to work, basic social services, and the means to access their basic needs. Over the past 18 months, Lebanon has been impacted by multiple and compounding crises which has exacerbated these challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdowns, the economic crisis, reduced subsidies on basic goods such as fuel, and medicine, the inability of the government to form or to make reforms, and the Beirut Blast Port Explosion. Each of these crises has negatively impacted all populations in Lebanon, including refugees, and has led to a dramatic increase in poverty for Syrian refugees as well as Lebanese and other vulnerable families.

The economic crisis in particular has had a devastating impact on the country as a whole. According to the World Bank’s Spring 2021 Lebanon Economic Monitor, the Lebanon financial and economic crisis is likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top three, most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century and the Gross Domestic Product has fallen by 40% since 2018. As a result of the crisis, many food items, basic commodities and medicine have become unaffordable, even to the middle class. The numbers are staggering – the consumer price index has risen by 116% from August 2020 to July 2021 and the cost of the June 2021 food component of the survival minimum expenditure basket (SMEB) is more than six times the cost of the basket back in October 2019, an increase of 557%. Similarly, the non-food component of the SMEB (e.g. hygiene items, rent, utilities, health and education) increased by 525% from October 2019 to May 2021. In fact, a 32% increase in price was recorded between June and July 2021 alone .

Concurrently the economic crisis and COVID-19 restrictions have reduced income for households due to a high number of permanent and temporary job lay-offs, particularly among informal workers. According to a survey conducted in 2020 by the International Labour Organization (ILO), 60% of the Syrian refugees were permanently laid-off and 31% were temporarily laid-off. Only 11% of the respondents reported that they had worked during the lockdown. Changes to employment status were reportedly felt more by Syrian women than men, as 61% reported losing jobs due to COVID-19 compared to 46% of Syrian men according to WFP. Additionally, the ILO reported that income in March 2020 had decreased by more than two-thirds for both Lebanese and Syrian workers, compared to their average monthly income in the previous 12 months. Ninety-four percent of the employed respondents from both nationalities reported large wage reductions.

The government has largely been absent in responding to the crisis and is currently trying to form its third cabinet in just over one year. UNESCWA estimates indicate that more than 55% of the country’s population is now trapped in poverty and struggling to meet basic needs. Social protection programmes for Lebanese households are at a critical juncture due to the urgent and growing need for institutions that can deliver meaningful social assistance through systems that are viable over the long-term instead of temporary and reactive measures that are not sustainable over the longer term. Existing national social protection programmes are fragmented with limited coverage, providing minimal support and services for a very small portion of the population. The expansion of support through a government run cash card system or through a partnership with the World Bank is currently on hold due to legislative paralysis. Parliament ratified the loan for the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) on 12 March 2021 and, despite some problematic amendments, the loan has met its effectiveness conditions so should be moving ahead, although bottlenecks still remain and as of September 2021, no timeline for start-up has been released.

Lebanon’s Humanitarian Cash Response

Since 2012, cash and voucher assistance (CVA) has been featured as a key component of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, mainly for Syrian refugees, and has grown in size on a yearly basis. By 2018, CVA had evolved to represent over a third of the response and by 2020, over USD 429 million was injected into Lebanon’s economy through cash-based interventions, constituting a quarter of the response. The drop in overall percentage between 2018 and 2020 is likely due to the occurrence of multiple shocks in 2020, therefore this year saw the largest overall funding received for the LCRP.

As of July 2021, over 233,263 vulnerable families were receiving multi-purpose cash transfers in Lebanon, and of those, 232,099 were Syrian refugees, more than tripling since 2018 . The bulk of CVA is delivered through the Lebanon One Unified Inter-Organisation System for E-Cards (LOUISE) Platform composed of WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF. A smaller proportion of CVA comes through NGOs such as the Lebanese Red Cross and Oxfam.

In addition to growing MPC recipient numbers, the transfer value of MPC for each recipient household rose in 2020 in response to inflation and the rising cost of items in the SMEB, including food items. At the start of 2020, cash for food and food vouchers amounted to 40,500 LBP per person per month. By the end of 2020 and as of August 2021, cash for food is 100,000 LBP per person per month. This amount was capped by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) until September 2021 and has now been raised to 300,000 LBP per person per month. Monthly multi-purpose cash assistance was previously 262,500 LBP per month per family at the start of 2020 and by the end and current year, the amount was capped by MoSA at 400,000 LBP until August 2021. The UN has recently concluded talks with MoSA to raise both amounts to stay more aligned with continually rising prices. MPC as of September 2021 is 800,000 LBP per household. The cap was in place by MoSA due to concerns about social tensions over the declining value of salaries in LBP,

Assistance for Lebanese households include support through the National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP) and WFP that provides food vouchers for the poorest 34,000 households at 200,000 LBP per household per month. This project has scaled up since May 2021 to go up to an estimated 75,000 households by November 2021. . NPTP beneficiaries can be referred to additional services provided by MoSA or NGOs contracted by MoSA through their Social Development Centres however referrals to external services are not provided. Building on this programme, a project created by the Government of Lebanon supported by the World Bank to provide a cash safety net and increase access to services called the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) would support 162,000 households to receive multi-purpose cash grants as mentioned above.

RESEARCH

The purpose of this research is to map out possible ways forward for a cash plus approach in Lebanon, using WFP’s multi-purpose cash programme as a model. The research will explore possible ways to combine multi-purpose cash assistance with targeted complementary services as part of a more holistic approach to poverty alleviation rather than cash alone. In addition to exploring possible scenarios, the research will dig deeper into trade-offs of this approach, coordination considerations, synergies with social protection, and any remaining evidence gaps.

1. What are the operationally feasible cash plus scenarios for the WFP MPC programme, including both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ cash plus model options with a focus on existing referrals mechanisms? (e.g., services externally provided or provided within programme)

· Building on the current structures of providing multi-purpose cash through WFP, what could a large-scale cash plus programme look like in Lebanon?

· What types of financial, time, and capacity investments would be needed for each approach?

· How would moving towards a cash plus approach impact accountability mechanisms? Would changes be required and if yes, what changes?

· What key evidence gaps still need to be addressed?

1. What are the trade-offs of a cash plus approach versus the status quo?

· What impact will a cash plus approach have on the number of beneficiaries, cost per beneficiary, and the amount of assistance provided to households?

· Would there be winners and losers or risks of certain profiles being excluded with a cash plus approach?

· How can a cash plus approach be adaptive to a continually shifting context?

1. What types of coordination structures would be needed and what roles could the UN, INGOs, LNGOs, affected communities (or their leaders) and the government play?

· How would cash plus options connect to existing referrals systems? Would investments be required to strengthen these? Where do the strengths and weaknesses lie within the existing referral system?

· How would a large scale cash plus approach be coordinated – would existing structures be adapted or would new structures be required?

· Who could be the main players in implementing and coordinating a cash plus approach and what could their roles be?

· Can a cash plus approach contribute towards a localisation agenda? How can the government and LNGOs be engaged?

1. How can meaningful synergies be built between cash plus approaches targeting Syrian refugees and Lebanese?

· What is MoSA’s perspective on this approach and how can it be incorporated into its own social protection programming?

· What challenges or advantages could this bring to the government?

· What opportunities exist for learning and mutually reinforcing humanitarian cash and social protection?

*For more details, please refer to the Terms of Reference – TOR in Section 4 of the Document.*